1. Introduction: migration and nationalism

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I. THE RISE OF NATIONALISM?

If the 1980s witnessed the apparent birth of a polymorphous 'neoliberal globalization' built on the legacy of what Robinson (1983) called 'racial capitalism,' then arguably, it also coincided with another: the rise of 'multiculturalism' as discourse, policy, and practice in countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK. *Grosso modo*, Slavoj Žižek (1997) would refer to the combination of these two broad processes of neoliberalism and multiculturalism as 'the cultural logic of multinational capitalism'. Approximately thirty-five years later, we see occasional proclamations of the end of globalization (if not 'neoliberalization') (see e.g., Olivié and Gracia, 2020; *The Economist*, January 12, 2023), and while 'multiculturalism' as policy or discourse has waned (but see Kymlicka, 2021), it has been superseded by corporate-shaped discourses and policies of 'diversity' (Alba and Foner, 2014; Joppke, 2004; Faist, 2008). These discourses, practices, and policies of multiculturalism and '(super-) diversity' (Vertovec, 2007) in many countries appeared to reach their nadir in the scholarly study of 'post-nationalism' (e.g., Tonkiss, 2019). Yet now, it seems reasonable to conjecture that nationalism has filled the void left by the exhaustion of or resistance to neoliberal globalization,[1] and its associated economic and 'cultural logics' (Ko and Choi, 2022). While it is not our intent in this chapter to discuss the fate of globalization or neoliberalism, nor undertake any comprehensive analysis of the historical trajectory of nationalism, we think that reports of the rise of 'ethno-nationalism' (to be discussed subsequently) over roughly the last decade and half are often inadequately or erroneously conceptualized as an implicit or explicit reaction to the consequences of neoliberal globalization (for a similar argument, see Sabanadze, 2010).[2] In fact, Joppke (Chapter 2 in this book), argues that nationalism may *enable* neoliberal policies and practices of migration, including the promotion of highly skilled migration at the expense of accepting asylum-seekers, refugees, and less-skilled migrants. He refers to this as 'neo-liberal nationalism,'

as one variant of nationalisms that exist in practice. There is much evidence to support this, such as the range of ‘point systems’ or ‘tier systems’ that are used functionally to ensure economic growth in richer countries.

Part of our goal in this Introduction is to modify and complement the view that nationalism has increased in response to neoliberal globalization, and in fact, present arguments for why the surge in political manifestations of nationalism over the last decade may be less a new phenomenon than what it has sometimes been presented to be. First, scholars over the last decade have spoken of a ‘neo-nationalism’. According to Yiftachel and Rokem (2021) “neonationalism naturally draws on traditional nationalism but also displays its own unique combination of characteristics, such as opposition to migration, Islamophobia, anti-elitism and anti-institutionalism, a commitment to ‘free-market’ capitalism, and suspicion toward welfarism. These are coupled with increasing authoritarianism, affinity with religion, and a return of militarism and patriarchy” (p. 1). Yet claims of such a renewed nationalism often underemphasize that moments of anti-migration/anti-immigrant ethno-nationalism have existed since the purported emergence of nation-states and racial(ized) (colonial) capitalism in the 17th century, and certainly during the supposed hay-day of neoliberalization (e.g., Balibar, 1991; Breuilly, 1993; Cheles et al., 1991; Geary et al., 2020; Miles, 1993; Nagel and Grove, 2021; Sabanadze, 2010; Solomos et al., 2020; Wilpert, 1993).[3] In fact, some have associated nationalism with *anti-colonial* struggles, as in the nationalism of formerly colonized countries during the 1950s and 1960s (see Sabanadze, 2010). Second, proclamations of the rise of nationalism are sometimes confused with other processes (e.g., authoritarianism, nativism, populism, white supremacy, etc.), and we need to carefully try to disentangle these processes although they often are empirically interrelated in cases such as Brexit and the rise of right-wing political parties in say Austria, France, Hungary, or the United States. Lastly, if we stretch our eyes beyond ‘western’ countries, then there is also considerable evidence of post-colonial *de*-nationalism within African countries (Aniche et al., 2022). In sum, as Bieber (2018) writes, “There is no clear global trend that would suggest a rise of nationalism, but instead, there has been a rise of nationalist politics in some countries, either expressed by the rise of new parties, the electoral success of nationalist candidates or the shift of public discourse of established parties” (p. 529). Nonetheless, Jenne (2018) notes perceptively that “The aggregate level of nationalist sentiment around the world need not have increased for its aggregate *impact* to have increased” (p. 546, emphasis in original). Even in many places where nationalist sentiments or attitudes have not increased in the past decade, nationalism may have become more manifest and salient for policy, as political actors have mobilized around exclusionary forms of nationalism. Surprisingly, compara-

tively less has been written about the *consequences* or *impacts* of nationalism, including for immigration (Halikiopoulou, 2023).

Examining this impact for migration, immigration, and their related policies is a central premise of not only this Introduction, but in fact this entire book. We detail the putative effects of nationalist mobilization from Islamophobia and anti-Muslim violence or anti-Black anti-Brown racism in Europe or North America, to xenophobic violence in China or South Africa, to many other forms of exclusion, marginalization, oppression, and physical violence in different parts of the world. Part of this exclusion entails migration and settlement/citizenship (immigration) policies, but it would be wrong to think that such policies are merely the epiphenomenon of nationalism. Rather, nationalism may be the *effect* of exclusionary migration and immigration policies (e.g., Berdiyev and Can, 2022), and sometimes they will turn out to be mutually reinforcing. Similarly, we do not see racism and exclusion as *the simple consequence* of nationalism, but rather as entangled or 'articulated' (Miles, 1993) and we therefore have in mind a much more dialectical than causal understanding of nationalism.

Yet let us focus for the moment on the idea of nationalism itself. Nationalism, or more appropriately nationalisms (as we will attempt to define them later below) have always assumed different forms (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 1996; Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1990; Kohn, 1944). Writing from the perspective of two scholars in 'western' countries,' it is deceptively easy for us to assume that nationalism is limited to 'white' or 'Christian nationalism' but elsewhere nationalism is manifested differently. We might call these forms (which may be enduring or more provisional) '*variegated* nationalisms,'[4] to highlight how they are shaped and re-shaped by the intersection of global, national, or more localized processes. This moves beyond 'ideal types' fashioned notably by Kohn (1944) and implied by Bonikoswki and DiMaggio's (2016) '*varieties* of nationalism,' even if the latter recognize the provisional nature of nationalist forms. Thus, we see nationalist processes (some might say ideologies or others in the tradition of Foucault, 'discursive practices') as dynamic, but which congeal into unstable forms that may be more or less 'striated' (Tolia-Kelly, 2020). That is, they may be inflected with the dimensions of class, skill (see especially Moriconi et al., 2022), ethnicity (including language and religion), gender, indigeneity, 'race'/skin color, sexuality, and recursively shaped by regionalized, localized or 'micro' discourses, policies, and practices. Such striation is exemplified in the notion of *Uri Nara* (Korean for 'our nation'), which for many young Koreans can include 'white westerners' living in South Korea, *but not Joseonjok* (ethnic Koreans from Asian countries) or *Goryeoin* from the former USSR (Campbell, 2015).

Our task then, in this Introduction and this book as a whole, is to tease out some of these different manifestations of nationalisms since roughly 2010,

with respect to migration (mobility) and immigration (settlement). In doing so, it is crucial to underline that in this Introduction, we do not intend to cover the whole of the cavernous literature on nationalism from the 19th and 20th century, nor do we necessarily seek to explain nationalism; rather our aim is to emphasize the consequences of nationalism for immigration in the 21st century, and especially the last decade. In Section II, we begin by laying out the various theoretical or conceptual understandings of nationalism in relation to migration, drawing upon brief empirical examples to support our analysis. In Section III, we consider the related but distinctive notion of populism in relation to migration, and in Section IV, we focus on the consequences of nationalism for immigration. In the penultimate section, we reflect on a putative shift from nationalism to civilizationalism, and we finish the Introduction by briefly discussing the individual chapters in the volume that illustrate (or challenge) many of the ideas expressed in this Introduction.

II. NOTIONS OF NATIONALISM, ITS MEASUREMENT, AND ITS PURPORTED RISE

Notions of Nationalism

Nationalism is the complex entanglement of cultural, economic, political, and social processes (e.g., Smith, 2010). Bieber (2018) surmises that "Like air, nationalism is both ubiquitous and elusive" (p. 519). Nevertheless, he argues that:

> *Nationalism is best understood as a malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in a nation greater than other groups (i.e., based on gender, parties, or socio-economic group), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation*. (original in italics, p. 520)

Another way of putting this, is that nationalism essentially emphasizes the need to make cultural and political units congruent (Gellner, 1983; Freeden, 1998). This was according to Kedourie (1993: 1) invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. We might question Kedourie's temporal framing of nationalism, but the main message of the original doctrine was that (1) humanity is naturally divided into nations, (2) nations are known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained, (3) the only legitimate form of government is national self-government, and (4) the members of the nation can reach freedom and fulfillment only "by cultivating the peculiar identity of their own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation" (Kedourie, 1993: 67). For Herder, one of the putative 'founding fathers' of the doctrine

of nationalism, nations were seen as separate and natural entities ordained by God. The best political arrangement, according to Herder, was achieved when each nation formed a state of its own. The only true and lasting state was one in which a nation is formed through natural kinship. States that contain more than one nation, on the other hand, were seen as unnatural, oppressive, and doomed to decay. Hence, Herder argued that states in which there are more than one nation run the risk of losing their identity, because they sin "against the principle of diversity," which makes them unable to fully cultivate their originality (Kedourie, 1993: 52). The nationalism of radical right-wing parties in Europe for example, and especially their claim to 'the right to be different,' is attuned to these aspects of Herder's nationalism.

Yet the production and reproduction of this (benign sounding) 'right to be different' is tackled by social scientists from very different traditions. One tradition is more likely to be associated with social and critical theory, and/or cultural and post/de-colonial studies (say in the tradition or work of Sara Ahmed, Balibar and Wallerstein, Foucault, the Frankfurt School, Paul Gilroy, Gramsci, Stuart Hall, Achille Mbembe, Omi and Winant, or Cedric Robinson, among many others). Here, the writings typically refer to affect, nationalist ideologies, the biopolitics of immigration, (settler) colonialism, (discursive or racial) formations, or discursive or racial practices and policies. In this sense, nationalism insofar as it strengthens the nation-state, is by its nature 'exclusionary,' and racism is central to organizing at least the western nation-state (e.g., Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Higham, 1955; Tudor, 2022). Different variations within this critical literature have been expressed. For example, in what Klotz (2000) calls a new non-racial xenophobia, the South African government and its citizens have (sometimes violently) excluded Zimbabwean immigrants. From a different perspective Behdad (1997), writing in the context of the United States specifically, sees the relation between nation and immigration as one of 'ambivalences' where migration becomes essential to not only national identity but to state discipline as well. Lastly, Behdad's argument seems to implicitly presage two related bodies of work that have emerged over the previous two decades. The first explores the 'affectual' dimensions of nationalism (Ahmed, 2014; Antonsich and Skey, 2017; Tolia-Kelly, 2020). At the risk of caricaturing this literature, this work stresses how power and inter-subjective feelings (Ho, 2023) (rather than individually discrete attitudes), are entangled in the reproduction of nationalism. Parallel to this affectual literature is a literature that seeks to understand 'everyday nationalisms' (e.g., Goode and Stroup, 2015; Fox and Van Ginderachter, 2018).[5] Such writings challenge or complement structural understandings of nationalism, and which Fox and Van Ginderachter describe as "bottom-up analyses of the quotidian practices, modalities, and habits that reproduce the nation in daily life" (p. 546). In turn,

these ‘everyday nationalisms’ have consequences for immigration or migrant workers (e.g., Collins and Bayliss, 2020).

Another tradition, in sharp contrast to the epistemological character of affect theory; perhaps rather more analytical than critical, and more common in (historical) sociology and comparative political science involves the examination of large-scale surveys. This literature generally relies on two pairs of conceptual distinctions that will be useful to rehearse. The first is between territorial (or civic) nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1991), and the other between endemic (or what Billig, 1995 calls banal nationalism) and virulent nationalism (Bieber, 2018). However, as Simonsen and Bonikowski (2020) admonish, national identity or beliefs cannot be confined to at least civic and ethnic nationalism, and in some cases these nationalisms are combined (Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016). This in turn suggests that the whole binary may be suspect (Kennedy and van Ginderachter, 2022; Smith, 2010).[6] That said, whereas territorial or civic nationalism is characterized by a view of the nation as a rational association, ethnic nationalism is rather characterized by a view of the nation as an organic, historic community of culture, held together by family-like bonds of solidarity. More specifically, it is argued that territorial/civic nationalism is more voluntary and open, while ethnic nationalism is deterministic and closed. According to territorial/civic nationalism, every individual must belong to a nation, but heredity is less important for membership in the nation. The ethnically defined nation, on the other hand, is one that you are born into, which makes the myth of common ancestry more important than territorial residence (Smith, 1991, 1995). Hence, while territorial nationalism is based on a common history and mass culture and allows people of different ethnic origins to take part in these, ethnic nationalism, with its myth of common ancestry, allows only people of a specific ethnic descent to be members of the narrow family circle depicted as the nation.

Consequently, ethnic nationalism implies by definition a collective exclusivity (Smith, 1999), or search for ‘purity’ (Mavroudi, 2010). While ‘we,’ the members of the ethnic nation, have a “definite origin in time and space,” all the others who happen to reside in the same territory “are guests and strangers” (Smith, 1999: 194). The drive for cultural homogeneity and purity is also alleged to be more common in ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1999), and it is logical that the family is one of the most fundamental metaphors of ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1991). This metaphor denotes something ‘natural’ (which implies something that is not chosen). In fact, the beauty of *gemeinschaft*, which nationalists promote, lies largely in its “natural ties” (see Anderson, 1983). Vernacular cultures, such as language and customs, are highly prized in the ideology of ethnic nationalism (rather than legal equality, which is essential for territorial nationalism). As a consequence, a populist political ethos is a predominant feature of ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1995, 1999; cf.

Hobsbawm, 1990). In ethnic nationalism, as in populism, ‘the people’ are the supposed final court of appeal.

With respect to the second pair of distinctions discussed above (that is, between endemic and virulent nationalism), the quotidian or occasional repertoire of flag-waving, anthems, or advertising can be contrasted with a “virulent nationalism that rejects the status quo and seeks to reassert the will of an imagined community over a political or cultural space is different from, but draws on, endemic nationalism” (Bieber, 2018: 520). In terms of virulent nationalism, it is difficult to find a more anti-immigrant example than the storming of the U.S. capital on January 6, 2021, but there have been violent episodes of anti-immigrant nationalism throughout U.S. and European history, among other regions of the world.

For quantitatively oriented social scientists, conceptualizing nationalisms through distinctions is insufficient. Instead, they seek to *measure* different forms of nationalism and their spread. In this literature, nationalism can be measured as a spectrum of levels of inclusion and exclusion and whether it is endemic, virulent, or even violent (Bieber, 2018). More specifically, measurements might involve a number of different *attitudes*. For example, are citizens nationally identified? Do citizens have pride in the nation’s specific institutions,[7] and does this lead to welfare nationalism or chauvinism (Fernández-Barutell, 2021; Rydgren, 2003b)? Do citizens have certain criteria for national membership? Do citizens trust other nationalities? Do citizens prioritize the nation or rank the nation over various identities? Do citizens prefer particular religious or racial(ized) identities over others (as in the case of Hindu nationalism, or Christian and white nationalisms in Canada, certain European countries, or the U.S.)? (Bracic et al., 2022; Dunbar-Ortiz, 2022; Kaufmann, 2020; Solomos et al., 2020). Do citizens believe the ‘nation’ has become too soft or feminine – what might be called a gendered nationalism? (Bracic et al., 2022). Do citizens vote for nationalists and does this lead to nationalist policies and violent nationalism as expressed through ethnic violence, hate crimes, or civil war (Bieber, 2018; Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016) and ultimately ‘generalized nationalism’? (Bracic et al., 2022).

The Spaces and Times of Nationalism

In our discussion above, we have referred to the ‘people’ and ‘community’ and the ‘ethnically defined nation,’ but who are ‘the people’ and how are they spatially delimited? While most social scientists interested in nationalism have been less interested in *explicitly* conceptualizing ‘space,’ others are dedicated to the project (e.g., Herb and Kaplan, 2018; Yiftachel and Rokem, 2021), and Koch (2023) and Rembold and Carrier (2011) speak of a certain ‘spatial turn’ in understanding national *identities* over the last twenty years.

Indeed, 'the people' or 'communities' to which nationalism appeals, do not stop at national sovereign borders, as has been made clear by the long-standing literature on transnational/diasporic identities and political mobilization across international borders. Here we should underscore the significance of networks between white-identified nationalists in Canada, much of Europe, the United States and beyond (e.g., Hyman, 2020; Stern, 2022; Stewart, 2020; Varga and Buzogány, 2022). Yet, we should also emphasize the complementary state-led nationalism that extends citizenship of a particular nation state to 'ethnic nationals' who have never lived in their 'own' country. We are thinking of the German government's preference for the *Aussiedler* (ethnic Germans living in the former USSR) during the 1990s, the South Korean preference for *Joseonjok* (ethnic Koreans living in China especially), or the Japanese government's preference for 'ethnic Japanese' living in South America (see Higuchi, Chapter 7 in this book). Lastly, Hungary's Prime Minister, Victor Orbán's shifting nationalist and white Christian supremacist ideas also had to incorporate ethnic Hungarians beyond the Hungarian–Serbian border. In order not to disrupt this trans-border nationalism, Orbán reinvented the border as one between Christian Europe and an invasion of Muslims (Merabishvili, 2022).

Now, if explicit thinking about 'spatial metaphors' with respect to nationalism and immigration still seems relatively inchoate, one cannot say the same for the question of 'time'. Here, the literature makes it clear that myths of ethnic descent, focusing on genealogical ancestry, are of essential importance to ethnic nationalism. The myths trace, and attempt to prove, a link between the contemporary ethnic group, which claims the 'right' of the nation, and the founder (or founders) of the nation, which is typically depicted as a hero, or even a deity (Smith, 1999). In this respect, the myth of ethnic descent is a myth of a Golden Age (see Levinger and Lytle, 2001). With this ideal of a Golden Age, which typically is more fictitious than real, ethnic nationalists try to define what is, normatively, distinctive about the national community in question. As Smith put it, ethnic nationalists generally "define an ideal, which is not so much to be resurrected (few nationalists want actually to return to the past, even a golden past) as to be recreated in modern terms" (Smith, 1999: 263). By contrasting the great culture and civilization of the ancestors with contemporary decline or decadence, the myth of a golden past helps articulate a quest for renaissance (Smith, 1999). Besides the forgotten virtues, the roots of the 'contemporary evil' are sought in moral decay; that pleasure and vice have overcome discipline and sacrifice; and that the old hierarchies have crumbled away. Generally, the myth of decline tells a story of how the community lost its anchor, by giving way to individualism and particularistic interests at the expense of collective ideals (Smith, 1999). Golden ages are central for national movements as sources of political legitimacy, authority and authenticity that contribute toward narrating continuity against untoward change, crises, or

decline (Elgenius, 2011, 2015). In doing so, nationalists construct a past (often of national grandeur) suitable for serving the political present. The discursive content of 'golden ages' includes the need for moral guidance in a decaying present (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2022). According to Smith, this is a call to return, at least in spirit, to these earlier 'golden' ages of the nation's history" (Smith, 2009: 36). "Few radical right-wing parties wish to return to the periods they idealize (Rydgren, 2018) but they gain direction for a political project to reconstruct an otherwise doomed future on the basis of these, and the argument is for some radical right-wing parties and movements to make their country 'great again,' and for others to at least make it more similar to the way it was before (cf. Bonikowski, 2016). Thus, their ethnonationalist or racial claims are closely associated with defining the nation that once was, through a historical origin, cultural heritage, and significant national events. In doing so, the nation is narrated as one continuous and unified community of people, despite the overwhelming evidence against such notions (Elgenius, 2016, 2017, 2018).

For example, Yiftachel (2002) in the context of Israel/Palestine notes the entanglement of territory (the 'where') and time (the 'when'), and the 'when' involves a history of the nation that becomes mythical and homogenous in the quest for territory. For South Africa, Misago and Landau (2022) claim that "South Africa's national project rests on a chronotope – a narrative configuration of time, space, and morality" (p. 2). As Misago and Landau (2022) insist, "contemporary political speech discursively excludes them [migrants] from claims to a shared history" (ibid). Migrants become a threat to progress, especially economic progress, restorative justice, and liberation that were promised to South African citizens at the end of Apartheid. "In spatially removing them, they also run them out of national time" (ibid).

Is Nationalism Increasing?

Having devoted some time to conceptualizing nationalism, we now return to the difficult question as to whether nationalism is increasing. The COVID-19 pandemic aside, popular commentators might point to epic policies such as Brexit, or to the rise of individuals such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, Victor Oban, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump as irrefutable evidence of the sharpening knives of nationalism, but such proclamations risk confusing the *explanans* with the *explanandum*. Other scholars may not necessarily attribute it to individuals or even to major episodes of sovereignty but depart nonetheless from the premise that we are in a moment of 'heightened nationalism' (e.g., Antonsich, 2020).

In the beginning of this Introduction, we argued that it is tempting to view nationalism as a response to the ravages of neoliberal globalization, in other words that nationalism has increased since say the 2008 'great recession.'

We do not doubt that certain consequences of neoliberal globalization such as economic inequality, poverty, and un(der)employment affects nationalism, and this is borne out by some evidence. For example, Wamsler (2022) demonstrates that a combination of relative deprivation and group identity can lead to nationalist attitudes. But these elements of economic dislocation are not limited to the period of neoliberalism or its waning. Furthermore, we question whether nationalist and anti-migration attitudes or emotions can be read off from low wages, the threat of job loss, or un(der)employment, since that would reduce nationalism and racism to economic determinants, a linear causality, which we believe is, at best, an oversimplification (for similar discussions, see Balibar, 1991; Husbands, 1993; Sabanadze, 2010). In fact, if nationalism is associated with attitudes to immigration, research in the United States shows that such attitudes are 'intersectional,' that is 'white' Americans harbor more intense anti-immigrant feelings than do 'African American' or 'Latino Americans' (Tafoya et al., 2022). Elsewhere, Kayran (2021) points out, the presence of protective labor market institutions also mediates the relationship between these vulnerabilities and nationalist and anti-immigrant attitudes.

If scholars, when measuring attitudes toward immigration from large scale surveys, are in fact inadvertently measuring nationalism, then the literature on nationalism and immigration, is enormous (see e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Coenders and Scheepers, 2004). Insofar as the findings of such studies reach politicians and policy makers especially (who might enact immigration policies in their wake) then they are also of performative significance. What does the literature on attitudes toward immigration tell us about whether nationalism is increasing?

First, this literature generally relies on the analysis of major *surveys* conducted by large national or supra-national institutions. Most of these surveys are based on attitudes in richer countries. Second, since this literature is vast, uses a seemingly endless range of variables, draws on surveys across different time-periods, and different geographies (internationally comparative, national, sub-national), our review here will be necessarily truncated. One of the central elements of these surveys is the distinction between attitudes that are material or cultural in nature (Bloom et al., 2015), or that involve 'economic' or 'cultural' threats often associated with globalization (Castañeda and Shemesh, 2020). Others, such as Green (2009) or Kwon et al. (2022) measure attitudes based on the 'achieved' characteristics of immigrants (skills which are deemed valuable by host societies), and their ascribed characteristics (ethnicity, 'race,' or religion). These "provide the cognitive boundaries shaping anti-immigrant sentiment" (ibid: 2). However, as Kwon et al. note, these characteristics are often treated separately and therefore the precise nature of that combination is unclear as few studies examine the intersections of ascribed and achieved characteristics.[8]

Though Bloom et al.'s (2015) analysis does not directly discuss nationalism, they remind us of the ethnic preferences of citizens across different European countries. Extending their analysis further, they show how the perceived 'material' or 'cultural' threats of certain ethnically defined groups shape these attitudes. As they write:

> we show that different dimensions of perceived threat – material and cultural – are key to explaining what types of immigrants citizens of European publics prefer. Threat to group values and identity leads individuals to prefer allowing in people more like themselves. In contrast, those who perceive a threat to tangible individual and group interests prefer immigration policies that favour immigrants from different ethnic, racial or geographical backgrounds, who are less likely to compete with them for resources. (p. 1772)

This may be evidence of ethno-nationalism among for example, white-identified citizens, but it may be also an indication of more complex attitudes, that vary by age, education, and skill (Hill, 2022). In a similarly nuanced analysis, Bracic et al. (2022) examine the relationship between ethnocultural national attitudes in the United States in 2018 during the Trump administration and support for 'separation policy' (separating children from their parents at the U.S.–Mexico border). While support for family separation was low among both 'white' Americans (17%) and American 'people of color' (7%), they find that ethnocultural nationalism – "beliefs that 'true' Americans are White, Christian, and manly—is associated with approval of separating immigrant children from their families at the border" (Bracic et al., 2022: 12). In exit polls, around 15% of 'White voters' and 30% of 'voters of color' believe that "being a Christian is an important part of being an American" (ibid.), and 'generalized nationalism,' the belief that "the United States is better than most countries" reached 70% for 'white voters' and a little more than 60% of 'voters of color' (p. 8). A comparative study of six European countries in 2020 showed that group-based relative deprivation is positively correlated with nationalist attitudes (Wamsler, 2022).

Differences in nationalist attitudes and their consequences for immigration may vary sub-nationally as well. Green et al. (2011) examine how nationalism and patriotism relate to immigration attitudes across Swiss municipalities, and they consider the impact of four municipality characteristics (socio-economic status, immigrant proportion, linguistic region, and urbanization) on nationalism, patriotism, and immigration attitudes. While they (2011) show that German-speaking municipalities in Switzerland expressed more nationalist views than French-speaking ones, their attitudes toward immigration were generally similar. At the same time, they found that other dimensions of municipalities in the two regions, such as the proportion of immigrants, socio-economic status, and urbanization shaped both nationalist attitudes

and attitudes toward immigration. Finally, Yiftachel and Rokem (2021) note the differences between the Mayor of Tel Aviv's commitment to protecting African asylum-seekers from the Israeli's government planned deportation in the late 2010s.

To close this discussion, if nationalism is indeed increasing around the world, then its implications for immigration need to be nuanced both intersectionally and sub-territorially. That is, the study of nationalism may suffer from that other sort of nationalism: methodological nationalism.

III. THE RISE OF POPULISM INSTEAD?

Nationalism and populism are entwined, yet distinct (Brubaker, 2020). Approaches to populism range from the more expected and long-standing view of political parties and their leaders (e.g., Kaufmann, 2020), to the significance of emotions (Betz; and Leykin and Gorodzeisky, Chapters 3 and 5 in this book, respectively) or 'affect' (Anderson and Secor, 2022). With respect to the former, radical right-wing parties in Europe are often referred to as populist parties. For example, in a volume edited by Kriesi and Pappas (2015) on 'European populism,' almost all parties discussed throughout the 16 case-based chapters belong to the family of radical right-wing parties. We are critical of this practice for various reasons (see Rydgren, 2017). These parties are mainly defined by ethnic nationalism, and not a populist ideology. Ethnic nationalism also largely influences the radical right-wing parties' populist message: these parties' anti-elitist message – directed against an alleged political-correctness elite – emanates primarily from the idea that an elite of established parties, media, and intellectuals have betrayed their country by embracing multicultural, 'sexually-correct,' and internationalist ideas and, often, for selling out their country's sovereignty to the EU, for example (Ruud and Muis, 2021; Rydgren, 2018). This is also reflected at the voter level, where we generally see that political distrust is a less important dimension than attitudes toward immigration to explain why voters vote for these parties (e.g., Arzheimer, 2018). Hence, in our view it is misleading to label these parties 'populist parties' – since populism is not the most pertinent feature of this party family. An appropriate definition should be both inclusive and exclusive, and it should be based on pertinent qualities of the category being defined. While we see the value of studying and theorizing populism as a phenomenon in its own right, that is, as a feature or dimension of politics that may be more or less manifest in the practices and programs of various political parties – across the ideological spectrum – we are critical of making a priori claims that populism is a befitting label for radical right-wing parties.

Yet, although not a pertinent feature, populism may still form an important part of the political programs, discourse, or strategies of radical right-wing

parties (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Betz, 2018; this book). According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 6), populism does not qualify as a full ideology, because unlike "'thick-centered' or 'full' ideologies (e.g., fascism, liberalism, socialism), thin-centered ideologies such as populism have a restricted morphology, which necessarily appears attached to – and sometimes is even assimilated into – other ideologies." More specifically, populism is defined "as *a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the* volonté genèrale *(general will) of the people*" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 8 (emphasis in original)).

Müller (2016) provides a less inclusive definition. For Müller, populism is not defined foremost by appealing to 'the people.' The reason is that it is too inclusive a criterion: "After all, every politician – especially in poll-driven democracies – wants to appeal to 'the people;' all want to tell a story that can be understood by as many citizens as possible, all want to be sensitive to how 'ordinary folks' think and, in particular, feel" (Müller, 2016: 2). Neither is it a sufficient condition to be "*critical of elites* in order to count as a populist" (Müller, 2016: 2). In addition, we must add anti-pluralism: "Populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people" (Müller, 2016: 3 (emphasis in original)).

Hence, for Müller populism consists of two key features, anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. First, Müller (2016: 19) views populism as "a particular *moralistic imagination of politics*, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified – but … ultimately fictional – people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." Yet, populists are not inherently anti-elitists, since they "have no problem with representation as long as they are the representatives; similarly, they are fine with elites as long as they are the elites leading the people" (Müller, 2016: 29 (emphasis in original)). Second, Müller (2016: 20) argues that populists always claim "that they, *and only they*, represent the people." All political competitors are seen by the populists as being part of "the immoral, corrupt elite." In a related way, populists tend to view all opposition as illegitimate and, indeed, to exclude those who disagree with them from "the proper people," which is always "defined as righteous and morally pure," by branding them as "enemies of the people" (Müller, 2016: 20; 3 (emphasis in original)).

This is the reason why populism, according to Müller (2016: 3), tends to "pose a danger to democracy," which "requires pluralism." Based on a *pars pro toto* argument, populists claim that they, and they alone, represent the people as a whole (Müller, 2016: 20), making political debates and parliamentary deliberations inherently meaningless. Hence, for "a political actor or movement to be populist, it must claim that a *part* of the people *is* the people

– and that only the populist authentically identifies and represents this real or true people" (Müller, 2016: 22–23). The people are constructed as inherently good, and populists depend on different criteria for distinguishing those that belong to the 'real' morally pure people. Such criteria can be based on conceptions of corruption, on productivity, and often on ethnic and racial markers (Müller, 2016: 24–25).

Müller's description of populism captures well the features of the radical right-wing parties in Europe. They are clearly anti-pluralist, tend to view 'the people' as morally good, and to exclude oppositional segments of the people. Yet, although radical right-wing parties tend to exclude elites from the 'good people,' this exclusion is selective and primarily focused on political and cultural elites that are held responsible for policies that are believed to threaten the ethnic homogeneity or sovereignty of the nation state (or sometimes, for cultural policies that are seen as decadent and 'unnatural'). Economic elites are usually only targeted when bound up with economic-political institutions that radical right-wing parties dislike. Moreover, aside from excluding (some) elites from the good people, radical right-wing parties tend to exclude large segments of the population on ethno-nationalist or nativist grounds, and this kind of exclusion tends to be more central and fundamental for these parties (cf. Mudde, 2007; Stavrakakis et al., 2017).

Moreover, the populist anti-establishment strategy has been crucial to the success of the new radical right-wing parties. A party that uses the anti-establishment strategy tries to construct an image of itself as in opposition to the political class, while trying actively not to appear antidemocratic. A party that is viewed as antidemocratic will be stigmatized and marginalized as long as the overwhelming majority of the electorate is in favor of democracy per se (Schedler, 1996; see also Van der Brug et al., 2005).

To create distance between themselves and the established political parties (i.e., both the government and the anti-incumbent opposition), populist parties aim at recoding the political space, with its diversity of parties, into one single, homogeneous political class. One way of achieving this goal is to argue that the differences between government and established opposition parties are irrelevant surface phenomena. According to the new radical right-wing parties, in reality the established parties do not compete but collude (Schedler, 1996; cf. Abedi, 2002; see also Sartori's (1976) conception of antisystem parties). Part of this strategy is often also to criticize the established parties for focusing on obsolete issues, while at the same time suppressing political issues associated with the real conflict between national identity and multiculturalism.

The populist antiestablishment strategy makes it possible for the new radical rightwing parties to present themselves as the real champions of true democracy – as a new kind of party – which takes the worries and interests of the 'common man' into account (see, e.g., Betz and Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2004).

Yet, the Manichean worldview of the new radical right-wing parties makes the politics of compromise and bargaining of liberal democracy difficult. Thus, the new radical right-wing parties commonly demand more referenda, which encourage clear yes or no answers, while discouraging compromise (Eatwell, 2003). Yet one can argue that populism is a characteristic but not a distinctive feature of the new radical right. Other parties use the populist anti-establishment strategy as well, and several parties of other political shades can be said to be populist in some way or another.

With respect to the emotional dimensions of populism (Betz; and Leykin and Gorodzeisky, Chapters 3 and 5 in this book, respectively) or perhaps more critically, its 'affectual' character, Anderson and Secor argue that:

> In political science, the inclusion of such feelings as an analytic factor has given rise to 'grievance mobilization models' in which authoritarian populism is understood to be fueled by political dissatisfaction, alienation, resentment against outgroups (specifically immigrants), and the failure of elites to respond to such grievances (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2008). However significant their findings, these models cannot parse whether the emotional factor stokes populism or results from it. It is even possible that anger and populism are on some level *the same thing*: the minimalist definition of populism (as "a thin-centered ideology" in which the "pure people" face off against the "corrupt elite" [Mudde, 2004: 543]) seems to already correspond to the structure of blame that is associated with the emergence of anger (Rico et al., 2017). (2022: 4)

However, they also caution that "explaining populism in affective terms runs the risk of eliding what lies behind populist subjects' anger, fear, or resentment, thereby sidestepping a broader analysis of what has driven people into this affective valley" (2022: 5).

IV. NATIONALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR IMMIGRATION

A central question in examining the relationship between nationalism and immigration is whether we should emphasize nationalism's 'janus-faced' qualities (Singh, 2022), that is its 'positive' and 'negative' ('exclusionary') consequences for immigration. Our critical approach steers away from becoming mired in this contradiction, to focus instead on its deleterious consequences. However, in doing so, we need to distinguish (1) between nationalist, anti-immigrant state discourses, policies and practices (including those concerning citizenship) that pervade the whole national territory, and those that are sub-territorial; (2) between the above, and the discourses and (violent) practices of un-elected nationalist radical right-wing political parties toward immigration; and (3) between the above and nationalist-oriented resistance

against expansive immigration policies, as manifested in civil society movements/social media discourse, as well as popular ‘media frames’ (Kefford et al., 2022).

First, in terms of the effects of state discourses, policies, and practices, another foundational analytical and critical question is whether nationalism is inherent in all such state effects, or whether exclusionary processes can be isolated from nationalism. We prefer the former interpretation, eschewing a liberal interpretation of nationalism (discussed briefly below). States (governments?) are anti-immigration and anti-immigrant in a number of ways. To begin with, nationalism may reflect and be reflected in citizenship policies. The classic distinction here is between *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* (Brubaker, 1992), which is supposed to be mutually imbricated in the distinction between ethno-nationalism on one hand, and civic nationalism on the other (Kohn, 1944) However, this dichotomy has long been the subject of critique (see e.g., Alba and Foner, 2014; or Blackburn, 2022 and Pogonyi, 2022, in the context of Eastern European countries). That is, countries with so-called *jus sanguinis* are argued to be no more ethnically exclusionary than those with *jus soli*, and those with *jus soli* no more inclusive than those with *jus sanguinis.* At the same time, others maintain that we can distinguish between civic, liberal, or multicultural nationalism. While civic nationalism tries to avoid ethno-nationalism, and liberal nationalism seeks to ‘thin it out’ by diminishing the power of the dominant group or groups, then multicultural nationalism emphasizes the salience of a ‘plurality of communities,’ in which all are equally valued (see Antonsich and Petrillo, 2019). Within this latter form of nationalism, *jus domicili* (length of residence in a country, and particularly western countries) may better explain citizenship than adherence to some civic political culture or ethnicity (e.g., Bauder, 2014; Hammar, 1990). That said, ‘white supremacy,’ the heavily policed ‘internalization’ of borders (e.g., the trans-Atlantic rise of ‘civic integration tests’ during the 2000s) and the ‘externalization’ of the same (‘remote control’) implies that obtaining residency itself is a difficult ordeal.

To add to this suite of putatively citizenship-defining nationalisms is a neoliberal nationalism (again, see Joppke, Chapter 2 in this book) As rehearsed earlier, we maintain that some states’ exclusion is indeed ‘neoliberal’ or even rooted in a ‘neo-Schumpeterianism’ (Samers, 2020). That is, certain kinds of migrants are favored over others (e.g., the highly skilled, the entrepreneurial, and/or simply the extremely wealthy) in the name of national economic growth, and to thwart dependence on welfare entitlements. While many states do recognize the ‘structural necessity’ (Castles and Kosack, 1973) of *less skilled* immigrants, and/or undocumented immigrants and/or refugees for capital accumulation (Collins and Bayliss, 2020; Samers, 2003; Yeoh and Lam, Chapter 8 in this book), such groups, and even citizens and ‘denizens’ (Hammar, 1990) are generally subject to what Tudor (2022) calls ‘migratism’

(the 'power relation that ascribes migration to certain people, constructing them as migrants and discriminating against them').

Migratization serves to exclude certain kinds of would-be migrants, but also weighs on the lives of settled immigrants, settled refugees, as well as naturalized citizens of color. A consequence at the extreme end may be 'hate crimes,' and even death, which some migration scholars in the Agambenian and Foucauldian tradition have referred to as necro or 'thanato-politics.' This takes numerous, horrific forms, from drowning in the Mediterranean, to death by dehydration in the Sonoran Desert, to the anti-Muslim ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in Bangladesh and Myanmar, or to anti-Asian violence in the United States. In terms of the latter, Singh (2022), among others, associate Trump's proclamation of COVID-19 as the 'China virus,' with '(white) nationalism.' While violent death may only affect a relative minority of the millions of immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees that cross international borders, the grinding effect of nationalist non-lethal exclusion on the physical/mental health and livelihoods of immigrants ultimately shortens lives. The literature here is extensive. We have in mind here detention centers that stretch from Christmas Island in Australian waters to the innumerable detention centers in the UK or European countries, to Texas near the Mexico–US border, to prisons in Libya, and in so many other parts of the world. Barker and Smith (2021) connect detention in Denmark to what they call 'penal nationalism,' which "is a form of state power that relies on the material and symbolic violence of the criminal justice system to uphold national interests" (p. 1545). These authors argue that

> these punitive and restrictive policies towards migrants are not simply exceptions to the penal regime but rather indicative of the character of the society itself. Danish values and national identity are maintained by locking people up, revealing a deep illiberal strain within one of the world's most equal, affluent, and liberal societies. (p. 1553)

Likewise, in what FitzGerald and Hirsch (2022) call 'insular nationalism,' states also violate international human rights norms. FitzGerald and Hirsch argue that right-wing administrations such as the Liberal–National Coalition government in Australia, and the Trump presidency in the U.S. are examples of how 'insular nationalism' can supersede international rights norms and judicial autonomy in the exclusion of immigrants and refugees. However, they contend that such nationalism is more effective at excluding adults than children. This may be the case in Australia, but the detention of 'unaccompanied minors' during the Trump administration and 'even' the detention of children in Denmark (Barker and Smith, 2021) impels us to reflect on this statement for situations that might arise elsewhere.

Migratization does not only involve 'carceral' processes; it may involve non-carceral elements that affect newcomers' health, housing, and employment prospects. For example, former President Trump's 'white nationalism' has led to a reduction in funding for refugee resettlement institutions in the United States which has created obstacles to the support of Somali refugees (Chikanda, 2023). There are no doubt innumerable examples of the way in which migration and citizenship policies negatively affect the health and livelihood prospects of immigrants but connecting these to nationalism remains difficult to demonstrate, a lacuna in the literature that again, this book seeks to address.

In any case, nationalism may have differential 'sub-national' or 'sub-state' territorial effects as we stressed above. Adam and Xhardez (Chapter 9 in this book) document how sub-state nationalism in the Flanders region of Belgium shifted over time from a more liberal nationalism that sought to address its collaborationist past and external expectations of Flanders' exclusionism, to a more right-leaning nationalism in which for example, civic integration tests have become the norm. In a different register, Gravelle et al. (2021) show how the spatial proximity of Mosques may encourage non-Muslims to vote for *nativist*, radical right political parties in the Netherlands, and this is exacerbated by the presence of tall minarets. In South Africa in April 2022, Elvis Nyathi, an immigrant from Zimbabwe, was taken from his home outside of Johannesburg, and then beaten, stoned, and set on fire (Misago and Landau, 2022). This terrifying incident is unfortunately not isolated at all, but part of a wider context of anti-immigrant violence in the country that flared especially in the years 2008 and 2019. As Misago and Landau eloquently put it:

> The simultaneous reification and demonisation of the foreigner coupled with the practical impossibility of preventing international migration have unwittingly placed the foreigner at the centre of a street-based national project. With migrants viewed as a demon at loose in the body politic, many citizens long for something akin to an exorcism. (p. 8)

One of the questions this raises is whether such violent acts are the consequence of political discourse across South Africa, or whether they represent the effects of a sub-state nationalism? As Misago and Landau insist, "while formal legal and political discourse often evoke nations writ large, exclusive speech and actions can be highly spatialised and distinctly sub-national in origin and orientation. As actors mobilise nationalist discourses of exclusion, they customise and localise them" (p. 3), so that there is "…the naturalisation of exclusion into people's political cosmologies in ways that vary across national space" (p. 9) (see also Antonsich, 2018 and Hooghe and Stiers, 2022 on anti-immigrant sub-state nationalist parties in Belgium). Indeed, they show that a combination

of localized community organizations, elected officials from political parties, and social media campaigns all contributed to the othering of migrants, their exclusion, and even indirectly, their death. Furthermore, while exclusionary discourses may be relatively universal across South Africa, violence is not, and in certain places, South Africans have defended immigrants.

A second distinction that we outlined earlier is the effect of radical right-wing parties. Anti-immigration issues are the core message of the 'new radical right,' in Europe (e.g., Bustíková, 2018; Mudde, 2019) and richer countries more generally (Elgenius and Rydgren, Chapter 6 in this book). As we also noted above however, these parties are at the same time involved in transnational mobilizing (transnational social or political movements) across the wealthier countries especially (Stewart, 2020), and are accompanied sometimes by strange political bedfellows.[9] Such parties and movements have been categorized as nativist (Mudde, 2007; Betz, 2018)[10] or ethno-nationalist (Rydgren, 2005, 2007), and they have framed immigrants as problems in at least four different ways (Rydgren, 2003a): first, as reiterated above, as a threat to ethnonational identity and/or as a threat to the 'white race' or Christianity; second, as a major cause of criminality and other kinds of social insecurity; third, as a cause of unemployment (e.g., Bustikova and Guasti on anti-immigrant political discourse in the Czech Republic, Chapter 10 in this book); and fourth, as abusers of the generosity of the welfare states of western democracies, which results in fewer state subsidies and other benefits for 'natives.' To this we may add a fifth frame: as purveyors of disease (that has given rise to 'coronationalism,' 'pandemic nationalism,' 'biopolitical nationalism,' and so forth (Aniche et al., 2022; De Kloet et al., 2020). The first two of these frames can be treated as a manifestation of the ethno-pluralist doctrine (i.e., that different ethnicities should not 'mix' lest cultural specificities disappear, and insecurity and crime increase), whereas the third and fourth frames can be treated as part of a welfare chauvinist doctrine in which immigrants and 'natives' are depicted as competing for limited economic resources. In such a conflict situation, immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors, pitted against 'natives' who are entitled to keep the entire cake for themselves. Hence, in this view immigration is seen as a zero-sum game in which one side always loses what the other side gains, and in addressing the third and fourth frames, the new radical right-wing parties have promoted the idea of 'national preference,' that is, giving 'natives' priority when it comes to jobs, housing, health care, and so on. Their proposals can be characterized as a sort of 'reverse affirmative action' (e.g., Zaslove, 2004; Rydgren, 2003b). In some countries, such as Norway and the Netherlands in particular, a sixth frame has been increasingly common: to frame Muslim immigrants as a threat against the liberal values of their countries (Akkerman, 2005). The resonance for anti-Muslim messages grew after September 11, 2001, and in connection

with recurrent Islamist terror attacks around the world (see Kallis, 2018). In fact, September 11 can be seen as an important turning point in the rhetoric of the radical right – and in the resonance of this rhetoric. After this date, as Arzheimer (2018) notes, criticizing Islam abroad and at home has become the socially acceptable alternative to more openly xenophobic statements. More generally, there is a trend that radical right-wing parties and movements increasingly mobilize in terms of not only national identity but also religious identity, defending what they call the Judeo-Christian identity against the threat of Islam (see Minkenberg, 2018). At the same time, however, the radical right has continued with their exclusionary rhetoric – and, in some places, also practices – against other groups as well, such as Roma. In addition, although antisemitism is not as central for the contemporary radical right as it was in earlier generations – and still is among neo-Nazi groups and related extreme right-wing organizations – it is still visible within some parties and movements (see Wodak, 2018). In terms of political contestation, Chinese ultra-nationalist groups inspired by western 'alt-right' groups have expressed their vocal opposition to more liberal policies of immigration in China. This opposition has strong Islamophobic under-tones, and racist on-line media coverage of especially African immigrants in Guangzhou has provided an erroneous perception of the extent of African and undocumented migration to China (Speelman, 2022). Yet, such opposition may also eat into the idea of a 'neoliberal nationalism' insofar as "commentators argue that the suggestion that immigrants are needed for China's development to succeed goes against the spirit of China's national rejuvenation project, which at its core is about overcoming humiliation by and dependence on foreigners" (Speelman, 2022: 11).

Beyond Nationalism?

According to Brubaker (2017) we are witnessing a 'partial shift from nationalism to 'civilizationism'' in the rhetoric and programs of radical right-wing parties, and a shift driven by "a striking convergence in the last 15 years around the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam" (pp. 1191–1193) in 'western' countries (see also Morieson, 2023 who speaks alternatively of a 'civilizational populism,' and Stewart, 2020). Arguably, this shift to civilizationalism has promoted a rise of an identitarian Christianism based on the contradictions of a secularist and liberal rhetoric, out of the civilizational preoccupation with Islam. Civilizationism has come to constitute an increasingly important part of the rhetorical nexus of exclusion and compete with ethno-nationalism. More generally, the resonance for anti-Muslim messages became enlarged after September 11, 2001, and in connection to recurrent Islamist terror attacks around the world (see Kallis, 2018). Although civilizationism has provided a platform for positioning along secular Christian identity, for most radical

right-wing parties a liberalist rhetoric and defense of gender equality, gay rights and freedom of speech has not been at the forefront but used selectively strategically to raise boundaries vis-à-vis Muslim migrants (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2019). We would argue that ethnic nationalism, or nativism, is still the core frame of radical right-wing parties in Europe and that civilizationalism for most radical right-wing parties is a complementing strategy and/or ideological current that sometimes is used smoothly together and sometimes causes some strains and inconsistencies. However, there is some variation across radical right-wing parties, where the Netherlands in particular stands out as a case closer to the description given by Brubaker (2017).

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Bringing together the long-standing conceptual critiques of nationalism, we see nationalism as a set of (trans-)territorial, exclusionary, and anti-immigrant state discourses, policies, and practices, that either cover the whole national territory or that are sub-territorial; as a set of discourses and (violent) practices of un-elected nationalist radical right-wing political parties; and as nationalist-oriented resistance against *certain forms* of more expansive immigration (policies), as manifested in civil society movements, whether they occur off-line, on-line, or a combination of both. This resistance has to be understood as not only sub-territorial, but also inflected intersectionally, with different groups of citizens (and even legally resident immigrants) embracing, rejecting, or remaining ambivalent about nationalism and its consequences for immigration. Such a view of nationalism does not necessarily follow the strictures of ethno-and civic (territorial) nationalism, and these 'variegated nationalisms' should not be conceptually restricted to wealthier countries, even if Eurocentrism and white supremacy figure as strong forces in nationalism.

While it may be that nationalism is a transcendent and ineluctable feature of nation-states and that *all* national states are *sui generis* exclusionary (as a number of critical theorists have insisted), we are sympathetic to Joppke's claim (Chapter 2 in this book) that nationalism is in fact neoliberal (or neo-Schumpeterian), at least in the wealthiest countries. That is, nationalism's consequences for immigration include the recruitment of the highly skilled and the selective or 'differential inclusion' (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013) of asylum-seekers or refugees. If nationalism is indeed 'neoliberal,' then nationalism cannot be viewed as unequivocally increasing, but rather as a conjunctural feature of nation-states that emerged at least several decades ago. While nationalism *alone* may not be responsible for anti-immigrant rhetoric, policies, and practices (and it may be difficult to measure), it seems to exert its continuously painful and deadly consequences.

NOTES

1. We do not engage in the debate around the (continued) existence of neoliberalism, neoliberalization, or globalization. Our use of these concepts is provisional and instrumental, while implicitly accounting for the critiques of them.
2. Writing in 2010, Sabanadze had already dismissed the rise of a 'new' ethno-nationalism.
3. However, some argue that nations preceded nationalism itself (see e.g., Miles, 1993), while remarkably, others only date nationalism, at least in the United States, to 1945 (Kelly and Kaplan, 2001).
4. Here we are adapting Brenner et al.'s (2010) notion of 'variegated neoliberalizations.'
5. See Fox and Van Ginderachter (2018) for a distinction between 'everyday nationalisms' and 'banal nationalism' (cited subsequently).
6. Other authors have pointed out that ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism often have 'good' and 'bad' connotations respectively, and so there are normative, ideological, and political assumptions associated with this dichotomy (see Pogonyi, 2022). Second, the assumption that 'ethnic nationalism' is more exclusionary and civic nationalism more inclusionary has been called into question in the 21st century, especially in relation to Muslims in Europe (see Bieber, 2018; Simonsen and Bonikowski, 2020).
7. For Green et al. (2011), pride in a nation's institutions is more associated with 'patriotism' than nationalism.
8. Kwon et al. (2022) not only focus on the interaction between them but establish 'ideal-type categorizations of anti-immigrant attitudes' (tolerant, illiberal liberal, moderate individualistic, individualistic, religious, racial capitalist, and exclusionary) that work within ascribed and achieved characteristics.
9. For example, Selzer (2022) recounts the highly publicized episode on New Years' Eve in Cologne when German women were being harassed by asylum-seekers or refugees, and so-called feminist thinkers and the radical right shared a common animosity toward Islam following the incident.
10. According to Betz (2017: 3), nativism refers to political parties and movements that "seek to preserve, restore or reconstruct selective aspects of native culture in reaction to a perceived external threat" (Teeuwen 2013: 53; quoted in Betz), or as an ideology that "holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007: 19).

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